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A year ago, the United States (hereafter, the "US") Supreme Court
delivered one of its most significant antitrust ruling in the last decades. l In
the Curtis v. Trinko case (hereafter, "Trinko"). the Supreme Court radically
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A year ago, the US Supreme Court adopted itsfa1TW1.LS judgment in the Trinko case.
This ruling has significantly naTTlJlued the scope ofapplicability ofUS antitrust law
provisions in netwurk industries. On the substantive ground, the Supreme Court
dismissed the existence ofthe essentialfacility doctrine in US antitrust law. On the
jurisdictional ground, the Supreme Court considered that antitrust law should not
be applied where sector specific remedies existed and could be enforced. These two
findings contrast with the CUTTent state ofEC law. Asfar as the substantive issues
are concerned, recent cases show that the European Commission heavily relies on
antitrust law's essential facilities arguments in netwurk industries. As far as the
jurisdictional issue is concerned, the decision making practice of the Commission
reveals that it is ready to enforce competition rules in sectors where specific remedies
can be enforced or have already been enforced (e.g. in the Deutsche Telekom case).
The present article intends to cast light on the divergtrlces between the US and the
EC approaches. It suggests that while on the substantive ground the Supreme
Court's findings could fruitfuUy inspire EC authorities, the jurisdictional
prjnciples set out in Trinko should not necessarily be transposed as such in the EC.
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circumscribed the substantive and institutional scope for antitrust intelVen-
tion in network industries. In short, the 1996 Telecommunications Act
(hereafter, the "1996 Act") requires incumbent local exchange carrier
(hereafter, "ILEC") to provide access to their operations support systems
(hereafter, "OSS") i.e. a set of systems used for providing services to
customers without which rival local exchange carriers (hereafter, "LECs")
cannot enter and operate on the market. The Trinko case concerned
Verizon's (the lLEC in New York State) ordering system. Competitive LECs
usually sent orders for services through an electronic interface with
Verizon's ordering system. Verizon completed certain steps in fulfilling
the order and subsequently confirmed these orders through the same
interface. Effective access to Verizon's OSS was thus necessary for
competitive LECs to provide services to customers. In 1999, Verizon's
competitors complained to regulators that a substantial number of
customers' orders were going unfulfilled, in violation of Verizon's obliga-
tions to provide access to OSS. A settlement was reached whereby Verizon
accepted to implement a series of regulatory remedies for ensuring effective
access to its OSS. A complainant nonetheless filed a class action lawsuit
before a federal court claiming that Verizon's reluctance to provide effective
access to OSS amounted to a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
case was eventually brought before the US Supreme Court.
The Trinko case led the Supreme Court to give interesting guidance on two
cornerstones of antitrust law. A first issue - of a substantive nature - was to
determine whether antitrust rules should be used for validating new
entrants' access demands on the basis of (i) the case law relating to refusals
to deal by monopolists and (ii) the "essential facilities" doctrine. A second
issue - of a jurisdictional nature - was to determine whether antitrust rules
should be enforced in sectors that are already subject to sector specific
legislation. These issues have arisen in similar terms in the European
Community (hereafter, the "EC"). The answers of the US Supreme Court
to these two important questions mark a radical departure from previous
case law and, more importantly for the present paper, from the approach
taken by the EC courts and the European Commission (hereafter, the
"Commission"). As will be seen, where the Supreme Court tends to
circumscribe the scope of application of competition law, European
authorities tend to expand it.
The purpose of the present article is to cast light on these divergences and to
address the question of whether a similar approach to that of the US
Supreme Court should be promoted in the EC legal order. The discussion is
organised as follows. First, the issue of access to an essential facility is
analysed (I). Second, the issue of the scope of applicability of antitrust rules
to sectors subject to specific legislation is examined (II). Third, some
concluding remarks are given (III).
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1. REFUSALS TO DEAL AND THE "ESSENTIAL FACILITIES"
DOCTRINE
The US ruling in Trinko considerably narrows the applicability of Section 2
of the Sherman Act to refusals to deal and "essential facilities" claims (1).
The EC position and in particular the Commission's one is at odds (2).
Several elements suggest that the Commission could gain from bringing its
decision-making practice more in line with Trinko (3).
1.1. The US Supreme Court RUling In Trinka
In Trinko, the complainant argued that Verizon had infringed Section 2 of
the Sherman Act by wilfully refusing access to some of its network elements
in order to prevent competitors from providing services at competitive
conditions to customers.2 In the complainant's view (i) Verizon's conduct
amounted to an illegal refusal to deal within the meaning ofAspen Skiing (ii)
the "essential facilities" doctrine as developed by lower courts should apply
to Verizon's behaviour.
The first of these claims concerned the question whether a monopolist can
legitimately refuse to deal with its competitors. This question has been a
thorny issue in US antitrust law for the past decades. The US courts have
tackled this issue by adumbrating the principle that antitrust law does not
impinge on firms' freedom to decide whether they should deal with their
competitors or not.s However, this freedom has not been left unlimited. In
Aspen Skiing, the US Supreme Court held that when a firm intentionally
refuses to deal in order to achieve or attempt monopolization of a market, a
restriction of this firm's freedom may be ordered through compelling it to
grant access to its inputs under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.4
This issue lies at the heart of the present Trinko ruling where the US
Supreme Court takes a restrictive approach to the interpretation of Aspen
Skiing. The Court recalls that the exception to lawful refusals to deal in Aspen
Skiing only applies in a narrow set of circumstances which were not present
in casu for two reasons. First, the refusal to deal must be "unambiguously"
motivated by the willingness to achieve an anticompetitive end in the long
The complainant was not a competitor but a customer. Its /ocw standi was justified because
the incumbent's conduct allegedly prevented new entrants from operating efficiently on the
market or from entering the market. Thus it discouraged customers from remaining with
competitors and/or subscribing to competitors' offers. The concurring opinion by justice
Stevens (joined by justice Souter and justice Thomas) denied standing to the customer
holding that only competitors could have advanced a claim on the basis of Section 2.
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. SOO, S07 (1919).
A5pen Skiing Co. v. A5pen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985).
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run.S In TrinJw, nothing in Verizon's conduct could lead to the inference of
a wilful intent to monopolize. Also, in Aspen Skiing the defendant refused to
sell even if compensated at its own retail price while no similar conclusion
could be drawn from Verizon's reluctance to interconnect at the cost
provided for by the 1996 Act. Second, in Aspen Skiing, the defendant refused
to provide its competitor with a product which it already sold on the retail
market to other customers. In Trinlw, the services at stake were not otherwise
marketed or available to the public.
The second claim raised by the complainant concerned the so called
"essential facilities" doctrine. This doctrine embodies a derogation
comparable to the Aspen Skiing exception in fields where, for various
reasons, a firm holds control over an asset to which a competitor must have
access in order to operate on a given market. This concept was created by
inferior US courts in order to compel infrastructure owners to grant access
to their facilities provided four conditions are met: (i) the firm controlling
the facility must be a monopolist, (ii) competitors must not be practically or
reasonably able to duplicate the essential facility, (iii) competitors must be
denied the use of the facility, (iv) provision of access to the facility must be
feasible.6 Typical examples of "essential facilities" have been prevalent in,
for instance, utilities such as railway bridges,' electricity power plants,8
telecommunications network9 etc.
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importance in utilities sectors where access is often guaranteed through
regulation because competitors seeking access to incumbents' infrastructu-
res may no longer be entitled to rely on the "essential facilities" doctrine.
1.2. The EC approach to Refusals to Desl and Essential FacilitIes
In the EC, the question of exclusionary refusals to deal by dominant
undertakings was first analysed by the ECJ in Commercial Solvents. IO The
Court held that the refusal to supply raw material to a competitor could
amount to an abuse of a dominant position under Article 82 EC provided it
led to the exclusion of its competitors from the market. Against this
background, the Commission developed an "essential facilities" doctrine
whereby it initiated a number of Article 82 EC actions against refusals of
access to facilities such as ports,II computer reservations services,12 landing
and take-off slots,13 pipelines,14 financial payment systems,15 etc.
Rather than relying on the "essential facilities" lexical, the Court of First
Instance (hereafter, the "CFI) and the European Court of Justice
(hereafter, the "ECJ") introduced in MagiU the concept of "exceptional
circumstances" in which the owner of a non duplicable asset may be forced
to grant access to it to competitors pursuant to Article 82 EC.16 This concept
was clarified by the ECJ in Bronnerwhere three conditions were laid down for
The TrinJw case constitutes a major reduction in significance of the
"essential facilities" doctrine. The Supreme Court indeed challenges the
validity of a doctrine that was "crafted by some lower courts" that it had
never recognised in previous cases. In addition to this, the Court notes that
in any event, if such a doctrine were recognized, it could only apply where
access is unavailable. This is unlikely in sectors where sharing requirements
are or can be imposed through regulation. The latter finding is of utmost
Indeed, the monopolist had tenninated a profitable commercial relationship and had thus
no other rational explanation for its behaviour than the goal of eliminating its competitor.
This is, of courst, in addition to the 'jwilful" intent to eliminate competition. See Mel
Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co.• 708 F.2d 1081, IIS2 (7th Cir. 1985). As a consequence
of these suiet conditions, there were only a few successful access demands. However, the
"essential facility" doctrine was expanded over the borders of utilities sectors. ConU'over-
sially, the doctrine was applied to Intellectual Property (hereafter "IP") right!. Holders of
intellectual property rights were required to grant licences of their 1f right! to competitors.
These developments led to acrimonious criticisms from the industry. In particular, patent and
copyright holders were concerned that the limitation. to exclusivity flowing from IP right
would not enable them to reap .ufficient reward for their inventive effort and would disrupt
the fundamental incentive for innovation which lies at the heart of IP protection. See
Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1566 (S.D.
Fla. 1988).
United States v. Tenninal Railroad Ass'n, 224 US MIS (1912).
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 US 366 (1973).
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Gir. 1983).
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Eg, 6 March 1974, Commercial Solvents v. Commission, Case &-7/73, ECR [1974]-223.
See Commission Decision of 21 december 1995, Port of Rodby, OJ L 55 of 26 February 1994
at p. 52; Commission Decision of 21 december 1995, Sea Containers/Stena Sealink, OJ L 15
of 18 January 1994 at p. 8; Commission Decision of I I June 1992, Sealink/B&:I·Holyhead,
interim measures, not published.
See Commission Decision of 4 november 1988, London European/S2.bena, 1988 OJ L 317 of
24 november 1988 at p. 47.
See Commission Decision of20July 1995, Swissair/S2.bena, OJ C 200 of 4 August 1995 at p. 10.
See XXIII Report on Competition Policy, (1994) at § 80 and §§ 22S-224 where the
Commission cites the DUma case.
See XXVII Report on Competition Policy, (1997) at § 68 where the Commission mention.
cites the La PosU/Swijl proceedings.
See EC], 6 april 1995, Radio Telefi. Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v.
Commission, C241/91 and C242/91, ECR [1995]·743. MagiU represented a significant
furthering of the abovementioned doctrine whereby the Commission applied the concept in
the sphere oflP. Without explicitly referring to the "essential facilities" concept, both courts
upheld the Commission's decision. The transposition of "essential facilities"·like principle.
in the field of IP led to much controversy. In the recent IMS HIfJ1UI C4U, the Court, refined the
B.......... conditions by holding that "for the refusal by an undertaking which own. a copyright
to give access to a product or .ervice indispensable for carrying on a particular business to be
treated as abusive, it is sufficient that three cumulative conditions be satisfied, namely, that
that refusal is preventing the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential
consumer demand. that it is unjustified and such as to exclude any competition on a
secondary market". See EC], 29 april 2004, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health
GmbH & Co. KG, C418/0I, not yet published at § MI. See also Commission Decision of 3July
2001, NnC Health/IMS Health: Interim Measures, OJ L 49 of 28 February 2002 at p. 18.
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forcing facilities owners to grant access: (i) the refusal of access to a facility
must be likely to prevent any competition at all on the applicant's market,
(ii) the access must be indispensable or essential for carrying out the
applicant's business and (iii) the access must be denied without any
objective justification.I7
Although Bronner might at first sight have been interpreted as a case
reducing the possibility to pursue the enforcement of "essential facilities"
policies, the Commission nonetheless continued to extensively use the
concept in the field of network industries. I8 An example of this can be
found in the Commission's decision in the Georg Verkehrsorganisation GmbH
(hereafter, "GVG") case. I9 GVG, a German railway undertaking intended to
provide an international passenger service from Germany to Milan and
back. In order to do so, GVG needed to enter into a number of
arrangements with an Italian railway undertaking. First, pursuant to EC
legislation, access to the Italian rail passenger transport market required the
conclusion of an "international grouping arrangement" with an Italian
railway undertaking. Second, GVG needed to be provided with infrastruc-
ture capacity on the Italian market (time slots as well as a series of
information on availability of train paths, prices, signalling etc.). Third, GVG
needed to obtain traction to move the train on the Italian network
(locomotive and qualified staff for piloting the train). GVG thus asked
Ferrovie dello Stato SpA (hereafter "FS"), the Italian incumbent railway
carrier to enter into a series of access arrangements. Most of these demands
were left unanswered by FS and, where the latter did reply, it reluctantly
provided the information needed. GVG thus lodged a complaint before the
Commission on the basis of Article 82 EC considering that the various
refusals (i.e. to enter into an international grouping arrangement, to
provide the necessary information on the Italian railway infrastructure and
to provide effective traction) by FS constituted abuses of a dominant
position.
Applying in substance a Bronne7'-like test, the Commission came to the
conclusion that (i) GVG had no alternative means of obtaining the services
in question than by addressing to FS, (ii) the refusals by FS were notjustified
by any objective reasons and (iii) the refusals by FS bore the risk of
substantially eliminating competition on the various relevant markets
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identified in casu.20 It is of note that the Commission only referred to the
existence of an "essential facility" concerning the railway infrastructure.
Yet, the Commission applied, in substance, a similar test to the other assets
at stake (e.g. trains, staff, drivers etc.). A striking feature of the decision thus
lies in the fact that the Commission stretches the "essential facilities"
concept beyond the purely non duplicable infrastructure.21
1.3. Relevance of Trlnko for the EC
The Trinko case sheds light on two issues which are often being superficially
addressed in the EC. First, it underlines the importance of safeguarding
investment incentives for market players (3.1). Second, it recalls that a too
generous approach to access demands may promote collusive outcomes on
downstream markets (3.2).
1.3.1. Safeguarding Investment Incentives for Market Players
The Trinko case constitutes a new illustration of a classic dilemma for
antitrust policy: the trade off between the promotion of short term (or
static) consumer welfare and the promotion of long run (or dynamic)
consumer welfare. 22 Under the first concept, a competition authority will
typically intervene to ensure that access be granted to competitors so that
the consumer faces alternative sources of supply in the short run (access
based policies). Under the second concept, a competition authority will
allow an infrastructure owner to enjoy a temporary monopoly position and
will tolerate the charging of supra competitive prices to competitors if these
wish to obtain access to the infrastructure (infrastructure based policies).
This preserves the incentives for infrastructure owners to invest in their
facilities, improve them and innovate.25 It also stimulates other operators to
invest in their own facilities, leading to the existence ofalternative sources of
supply in the long run.24
In Trinko, the US Supreme Court delivered a "Schumpeterian" ruling by
underlining the dangers of the first approach and explicitly endorsing the
17 See ECj, 26 november 1998, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, C7/97, [1998] ECR 1-7791.
18 In these sectors, the second Bronner condition is generally met and the remaining conditions
have been broadly construed by the competition authorities.
19 See Commission Decision of 27 August 2003, GVG/FS, OJ L Il of16 January 2004 at p. 17.
For a comment, see Olivier Stehmann, "Applying 'Essential Facility' Reasoning to Passenger
Rail Services in the EU - the Commission Decision in the case GVG", (2004) 7 European
Competition Law Review, 390.
20
21
22
2S
2'
The Commission, however, did not impose fines because of the novelty of the case and
following the submission of a number of commitments by FS for tenninating the
infringements.
See, in particular, Commission Decision, supra note 19 at §§ 93-109.
See Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, TM EconmnUs ofEC Competition Law, 2nd Ed. Sweet and
Maxwell, London, (2002) at § 2.26.
See Office of Fair Trading, Innovation and Competition Policy, Part I - Conceptual Issues,
Economic Discussion Paper 5, March 2002, at p. 17.
See Roger Van den Berg and Peter Carnesasca, European CompetiJion Law and &ont>1>Iics - A
ComparatiTH! Perspective, Intersentia, (2001) at p. 56.
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second. The possibility to exercise monopoly power is an important vector of
competition, innovation, investment and economic growth. Therefore, it
must not be condemned on a per se basis and can only be held unlawful if
there is evidence ofadditional wilful anticompetitive conduct. Policies based
on infrastructure sharing of unique facilities are in "some tension with the
underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the
monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial
facilities" .25
In contrast, the European Commission is much less concerned with the
second approach. Besides the controversial IMS Health case in the field ofIP,
it can be argued that the essential facilities decisions adopted by the
Commission in utilities sectors do not sufficiently give importance to
investment-related issues. In eve, for instance, while issues of access to the
railway infrastructure could arguably be brought under the essential
facilities umbrella, doubts can be raised where the Commission pushed
the concept so far that it was considered unfeasible for the company
demanding access to set up and train its own pool of drivers.26 The
extremely generous and mechanical approach of the Commission towards
some aspects of access demands is unfortunate.27 It may have a disincentive
effect on potential competitors' innovations and investments because they
can free-ride on others' commercial advantages by arguing that the latter is
an essential facility.28 A more dynamic approach re-centred on long run
consumer welfare should thus be promoted in the EC.
Second, the conclusion of access agreements offers a convenient device for
monitoring adherence to a collusive scheme (explicit or tacit) on the
downstream market. Any deviation downstream can easily be detected by the
1.3.2. The Promotion of Collusive Outcomes on Downstream Markets
A second interesting feature of TTinJw lies in the explicit statement that
promoting the conclusion of all sorts of access arrangements between
operators bears a risk of facilitating "the supreme evil of antitrust:
collusion". Here again, the Supreme Court's reasoning can be contrasted
with the EC approach where the relationship between the "essential
facilities" doctrine and collusion has for the most been ignored by the
Commission (and is often overseen by practitioners and scholars).
EC competition law would, arguably, benefit from taking into account the
risks of collusive outcomes when applying the "essential facilities" concept.
In industries where, for a number of reasons (e.g. high sunk costs,
increasing scales returns, natural capacity constraints), the market structure
has oligopolistic features, the extensive enforcement of the "essential
facilities" doctrine may lead to collusive outcomes.29 This is so for a number
of reasons. First, in addition to the duty to grant access to competitors, EC
law has established a duty for infrastructure holders not to discriminate
between their competitors and their subsidiary.50 The combination of these
legal requirements may, to a certain extent, lead to harmonized access
conditions for operators on the downstream markets. This is problematic
because on oligopolistic market structures, the symmetry of costs between
operators is often cited as a critical factor for the likelihood of a collusive
outcome.
51 Of course, the risk that harmonized access conditions limit the
scope for price competition on downstream markets depends on the
portion of access costs within average total costs.52 From an abstract
perspective, it is impossible to determine whether the risk is high or low. Yet,
it should be noted that the more extensive the interpretation of the essential
facilities doctrine (as for instance, in the eVGdecision) , the more important
the common costs incurred by operators will be.55
This is relevant in utilities sectors where mark.ets are often structured along oligopolistic lines.
This results from case law and sector specific legislation. See, e.g., CFI, 15 september 1998,
European Night SelVices, T-374-375/94, T-S84/94 and T-388/94, ECR [1998] 11-3141. See
also Commission Notice on the Application of Competition Rules to AcceJS Agreements in
the Telecommunications Sector, OJ C 265 of 22 Augwt 1998.
See Commission's GuidelineJ on the AsseJSment of HOrUontai Mergers under the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, at § 48.
This is likely to be a minimal concern where access costs are a Hmited share of the average
total costs.
In eva, for instance, not only the access cosu, but also traction costs, ttaining costs etc.
50
SI
ss
..
so
See US Supreme Court ruling, supra note 1 at p. 8.
See Commission Decision, supra note 19 at § 95.
This approach is criticized by a number of authors. The Commission seems to move towards
the recognition ofa "convenient facilities" doctrine. See Derek Ridyard, "Compulsory Access
under EC Competition Law - A New Doctrine of 'Convenient FacilitieJ' and the Case for
Price Regulation", (2004) 11 Europtan Qnnpetititm Law Review, 269. Quite controversially,
Simon Bishop evoked the risk that competitors could obtain acceJS to any asset by proving
that it would "make their life easier". See preJentation delivered at the Fourth Lunch Talk of
the GCLC, available at www.gclc.coleurop.be.
See Opinion ofAGJacobs in Bnm..... at § 57: "Thejwtification in terms of competition policy
for interfering with a dominant undertaking's freedom to contract often requires a careful
balancing ofconflicting considerations. In the long term it is generally pro<ompetitive and in
the interest of consumen to allow a company to retain for its own use facilities which it has
developed for the purpose of its bwineJS. For example, if access to a production, purchasing
or distribution facility were allowed too easily there would be no incentive for a competitor to
develop competing facilitieJ. Thw while competition was increased in the short term it would
be reduced in the long tenn. Moreover. the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in
efficient facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to share the
benefits. Thw the mere fact that by retaining a facility for its own use a dominant undertaking
retains an advantage over a competitor cannotjwtity requiring access to it." See ECR [1998]
1-7791.
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incumbent through a close surveillance of the evolution of network traffic
(and especially of the traffic generated by its competitors). In addition, the
deviating operator will normally face an increase in consumer demand. He
may thus ask the incumbent to grant him larger volumes/access, thereby
signalling that he is deviating from a collusive line of action downstream.
Finally, the conclusion of access agreements enhances the possibility of
retaliation in response to a deviation from a collusive scheme.54 Access
givers could easily increase access price, undercut retail prices or downgrade
access quality in order to "punish" the "cheating" operator. Of course,
these parameters are often placed under regulatory control. But recent cases
show that such predatory strategies (e.g. margin squeezes) are extremely
difficult to remedy.55
The Commission should thus strive to ensure that the elimination of alleged
abuses of single dominance does not end up in the promotion of collective
dominance outcomeS.56
2. THE INTERFACE BETWEEN ANTITRUST RULES AND
SECTOR SPECIFIC LEGISLATION
The second interest of Trinka lies in the radical solution given by the US
Supreme court to the question of the interface between competition rules
and sector specific legislation (1). In the EC, the recent Deutsche Teklwm
decision portrays slight divergences with the US approach (2). It is, however,
not sure whether Trinka should be transposed as such in the EC (3).
2.1. The US Supreme Court Approach In TrInka
The question at stake in Trinka was to determine whether the enforcement
of antitrust rules should be admitted in situations where sector specific
Circumscribing the Seope of EC Competition Law in Network Industries?
remedies can also be enforced.57 The US Supreme Court takes a negative
stance on this. The court's reasoning is based on a costs/benefits rationale
whereby when a regulatory structure has been set up to reduce and remedy
the risks of a competitive harm, the additional benefits from antitrust
enforcement are likely to be limited. The Court finds three reasons in
support of this view. First, in the field of telecommunications, the US
authorization requirements and the other sector specific provisions
applicable to Verizon are very intrusive. Operators are placed under the
detailed scrutiny of the Federal Communications Commission which enjoys
significant powers to prevent the likelihood of competitive harm.
Second, the US Supreme Court stresses the costs of an expansion of Section
2 liability through the existence of "false positives" (i.e. false condemna-
tions where purely legitimate actions by an undertaking are held to be an
infringement of the antitrust rules).S8 In the field of network industries,
practices which have an exclusionary effect may often have nothing to do
with the intent to eliminate competitors and it would thus be inappropriate
to bring these conducts under the umbrella ofSection 2 of the Sherman Act.
Third, the US Supreme Court points out the fact that courts of law are ill
equipped to deal with the day to day enforcement of the remedies they
could impose on the basis of antitrust rules because this would require
"continuing supervision of a highly detailed decree".59 Hence, the US
Supreme Court comes to the conclusion that in fields where sector specific
remedies can be applied, it is preferable to refrain from enforcing antitrust
rules.
The Trinka ruling marks the recognition of a "pre-emption" or "exhaus-
tion" principle in the field of antitrust. Private claims on the basis of
antitrust rules should be, to a certain extent, exhausted where a sector
specific remedy exists. The ruling of the US Supreme Court suggests that the
scope of antitrust law in regulated sectors is a subsidiary one, in situations
where no sector specific remedies are available.4o
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See, for a formulation of this idea, Patrick Rey) "Collective Dominance and the
Telecommunications Industry", 7 september 2002. mimeo.
See, for an excellent discussion of margin squeeze practices. Dan~ien 'Geradin and Robert
O·Donoghue. "The Concurrent Appiication of Competition Law ana Regulation: the Cue of
Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector", Paper presented at the BT-
GCLC Conference, 10 december 2004, available at http://www.gclc.coleurop.be/conferen-
ces_workshops.htm
The promotion of collective dominance outcomes would be problematic because EC
competition law is lU-equipped to deal with abuses of joint dominance (and especially to
devise an appropriate remedy against anticompetitive parallel behaviour). This is probably
why the Commission haa been very cautious with using Article 82 EC against tacit collusion in
oligopolistic markets. For a good discussion of this. see Richard Whish, QnnpetitWn Law,
4"' Ed., (2001) Butterworths, at p. 479
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In the US, the telecommunications sector specific legislation explicitly mentions that it does
not prevent the application of the antitrust rules. The following question is then to determine
whether antitrust rules intrinsically embrace situations where sector specific legislation can be
applied.
See US Supreme Court ruling, supra note 1 at p. 14.
See US Supreme Court ruling, supra note I at p. 14.
It is now discussed in the US whether TrinAo shall apply to all sectors where a regulatory
structure exist.
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2.2. The EC Approach
Similarly to the US, the question of the interface between sector specific
legislation and competition rules has arisen in the EC. The first generation
directives (i.e. the first sets of directives that were adopted at the beginning
of the libera1isation process in a number of network industries) already
provided that the regulatory frameworks are "without prejudice to the
application of competition rules" .41 These directives, however, did not
indicate whether and to which extent, competition authorities would
broaden the scope of application of competition rules to sectors where
sector specific legislation applies. The Commission's decision in the Deutsche
Telelwm case clarified this issue.42
This case concerned the prices charged by Deutsche Telekom (hereafter,
"DT") to its competitors and consumers for access to the local loop between
the end of 1998 and 2002. The local loop is the physical circuit between the
consumer's premises and the telecommunications operator's local switch.
This infrastructure is generally controlled by the incumbent operator and
new entrants need access on fair and non discriminatory terms to the loop in
order to offer retail services to consumers and compete with the incumbent.
In March 1999, several of DT's competitors had lodged complaints before
the Commission arguing that DT's prices for access to the local loop were
incompatible with Article 82 EC. The prices charged by DT for competitors'
access on the wholesale local loop market were higher than the prices it
charged to its own subscribers on the retail market. DT thus prevented new
entrants from competin~ in the retail local loop market and deterred
entrance on the market.
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telecommunications regulator.44 DT considered (i) that the Commission
was not entitled to proceed against alleged infractions which have been the
subject of regulatory decisions at the national level, and (ii) that if there was
a violation of EC law, the appropriate course of action was the initiation of
Article 226 EC infringement proceedings against Germany in spite of a
direct procedure against the undertakings' whose conduct had been
approved by the regulator. These arguments were rebutted by the
Commission:
"the competition rules may apply where the sector specific legislation
does not preclude the undertakings it governs from engaging in
autonomous conduct that prevents, restricts or distort competition".45
In fact, the Commission observed that the charges for wholesale and retail
access to the loop were regulated but that DT was still left with a commercial
discretion which allowed it to restructure its tariffs in order to put an end to
the margin squeeze.46 DT could have avoided the price squeeze by
increasing the retail charges, which DT actually did but in insufficient
volumes. In addition, even when it enjoyed limited commercial discretion,
DT could have raised the prices of other non regulated charges. Thus, the
Commission considered that DT's behaviour was the main source of the
restriction ofcompetition and that Article 82 EC was the appropriate course
ofaction. DTwas condemned to a € 12.6 million fine. The prior application
ofa regulatory remedy was not regarded as ajustification for its behaviour. It
was merer taken into account as a mitigating factor for the calculation of
the fine.4
DT argued that its conduct could not be held as an infringement ofArticle
82 EC in that its tariffs had previously been approved by the German
The DT case provides a good example of a situation where (i) a sector
specific regulatory structure exists and has been enforced by a regulator and
(ii) a complaint on a similar matter is subsequently dealt with by a
competition authority under competition rules. The approach taken by the
Commission there can be criticized for two main reasons. First, on the
jurisdictional ground, it opens alternative remedial routes for complainants
without coordinating them through a rule of case allocation. Thus, there is
<I
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See Recital 26 of Directive 97ISS of the European Parliament and of the Council of SO June
1997 on Interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring Univenal Service
and Interoperability through the Application of the Principles of Open Network Provision
(ONP) , OJ L 199 of 26July 1997, pp. S2-52; See Recital S of Directive 96/92 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning Common Rules for the
Internal Market in Electricity, OJ L 27 of SOJanuary 1997. pp. 2~29; See Recital 6 of Directive
98/!lO of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998.concerning Common
Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas. OJ L 245 of 4 Sepltmber 1998, pp. 1·12; See
Recital 41 of See Directive 97/67. of the European Parliament and the Council of
15 December 1997 on Common Rules for the Development of the Internal Market of
Community Postal Services and the Improvement of Quality ofService. OJ L 15 of 21 January
1998. pp. 14-25.
See Commission Decision of 21 May 2005. Deursehe Telekom AG, OJ L 263 of 14 October
2005. p. 9. See also. Robert Klon and Jerome Fehrenbach, "Two Commission Decisions on
Price Abuse in the Telecommunication Sector" (2ooS) 5 Competition Poli<y N....ktter. 8.
This practice is called a "margin squeeze" because even if competitors are as efficient as the
infrastructure owner. they have to bear the costs of access.
..
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The conformity of prices for access to the local loop with German telecommunications law is
under the scrutiny of the German regulator.
See Commission Decision. supra note 42 at § 54.
See Commission Decision. supra note 42 at § 57. This solution is in line with the E<;J case law
on the restrictiollll of competition induced by State interventions. In short, competition rule'
can be enforced against undertakings as long as they keep some discretion. However. it shall
be discussed whether these principles should be transposed in the field of regulation. See
XXII Report on Competition Poliey. (1992) at § 195; See also Michel Waelbroeck and Aldo
Frignani, Commentairej. Megret, Le droit de la CE, Vol. 4 Concurrence, 2nd Ed. (1997). at
p.149.
See Commission Decision. supra note 42 at § 212.
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2.3. Relevance of Trlnko for EC Competition Action In Specific Sectors
On face value, the US and EC approach to the interface between sector
specific legislation and antitrust rules seem to be at odds. However, a
number of elements suggest that the Commission's approach can be partly
reconciled with the Supreme Court's approach in Trinko. There are indeed
some indications that the Commission is unlikely to initiate proceedings
where sector specific remedies can be applied. In the 02/T-Mobile decision, a
notified agreement on infrastructure sharing entailed a risk of foreclosure
on sites used for installing antennas, masts and other network elements.5o
However, the Commission voiced no concern in light of the fact, inter alia,
that a sector specific remedy was provided for byArticle 12 of the Framework
Second, on the substantive ground, there is a possibility that the decisions
adopted under each body of rules differ in the medium run and lead to
regulatory inconsistencies. Indeed, the approach under sector specific
regulation is often different from the approach under competition rules. In
the field of conditions for access to a network, for instance, sector specific
frameworks often take into account the investments incurred by the owner
of the infrastructure, the existence of intellectual property rights or the
necessity to preserve competition in the long run.48 In contrast, competition
rules are less concerned with these objectives. The "essential facilities"
doctrine does not mention the conditions under which access should be
given. Since competition authorities are primarily concerned with the
elimination of actual restrictions of competition, they generally give little
importance to the necessity that access conditions ensure sufficient rates of
return on investments and do not undercut incentives for innovation etc.
Therefore, sector specific regulators may legitimate access conditions that a
competition authority would on the contrary consider as incompatible with
Article 82 EC.49
In the EC, these attributes do not exist. Sector specific legislation is in
general not as intrusive as US telecommunications regulation. EC sector
specific legislation indeed leaves important discretion on NRAs to decide
whether to initiate action. There might thus be situations where NRAs fails
A similar approach was iaken in BT/MCI I, where in case of a strategic alliance, the
Commission concluded that no conditions or obligations where needed, in view of the
national regulatory frameworks to which both parties were submitted. The Commission
nonetheless reserved the application of competition rules, if regulatory action proved
unsatisfactory. See Commission Decision of27July 1994, BT-MCI, OJ L 223 of27 August 1994,
pp. 36-55 at § 57. See on this, Pierre Larouche, Competilion Law and &gulation in European
Ttl«mnmuni£alUms, Hart Publishing, (2000) at p. 312. This suggests, to a certain extent, that
the Dtutsc!ul TtlDunn case should be read on its facts and arguably, the Commission will only
follow this line of action in a narrow set of exceptional circumstances.
See European Commission, XXVII Report on Competition Policy, (1997) at p. 108.
That may, indeed, slow down the pace of regulatory reforms, reduce the efficiency of
regulatory schemes, increase legal uncertainty and affect investments in the sector.
Directive on electronic communications and could be used by NRAs if a
restriction of competition was observed.51 In other utilities sectors, the
Commission also seems to give preference to intervention by sector specific
regulators on the basis of specific provisions. In the field of energy, for
instance, the Commission decided, in the HFC Bank Pic/British Gas Trading
Ltd to refrain from action in light of the fact that UK gas regulator had
concluded that the risk of anticompetitive effect was unlikely.52 These cases
provide a clear illustration that the Commission gives priority to the
specialized authority and stays proceedings when a NRA is already
investigating a case on the basis of sector specific legislation. The
Commission's line of action in those cases neutralizes the shortcomings
that have just been mentioned.
The remaining difference between the US and the EC approaches is the
following. In the US, the application of antitrust rules to regulated sectors is
very clearly rejected through the adoption of the principle that the scope of
antitrust rules should not be extended where an appropriate regulatory
structure exists. In contrast, in the EC, the enforcement ofcompetition rules
in addition to sector specific rules always remains a reserved possibility,
which is left to the discretion of the competition authority.
It is debatable whether the US Supreme Court approach should be roughly
transposed in the EC. The Supreme Court's approach was probably
motivated by the fact that US telecommunications regulation is extremely
intrusive and that antitrust action in this sector is thus oflittle benefit. It was
also possibly encouraged by the fact that an expansion ofantitrust liability to
regulated sectors may trigger a flood of litigation through the initiation of
numerous class action procedures combined with substantial treble
damages claims.58
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See, e.g., Article 12(2) of Directive 2002/19 of the European Parliament and the Council on
Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and Associated
Facilities of 7 mars 2002 OJ L 108 of 24 April 2002, pp. 7-20.
Some consider that the risk of outright decisional conflict is limited because the rules laid
down in sector specific frameworks go further than competition rules and lead to the
imposition of more stringent conditions on incumbents. See Alexandre de Street, Robert
Queck and Philippe Vernet, "Le nouveau cadre reglementair~ europeen des reseaux et
services de communications electroniques" (2002) S-4 Cahim tU Droit Europim, 243 at p. 294.
While this is generally true, NRA.s and competition authorities follow different approaches
which could, in the long run, lead to substantial divergences.
See Commission Decision, 02 UK Ltd.iT-Mobile UK Ltd. of 30 april 2003, OJ L 200 of
7 August 2003, p. 59. The agreement could have been used as a blocking tactic against
competitors to slow down the pace of rolling out their networks. For an analysis of this
decision see Nicolas Petit, "The Commission's Contribution to the Emergence of 3G Mobile
Communications: an Analysis of some Decisions in the Field of Competition Law", (2004) 7
Europtan Comp.titiDn Law Review, 429.
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to enforce sector specific remedies. In these cases, the possibility to act on
the basis of competition rules could prove extremely useful. The Commis-
sion would start the procedure (by, for instance, launching a sector inquiry)
in order to bring the failing NRAs' attention to a particular problem. The
Commission would subsequently defer the case to the regulator and the
problem would be handled through the application of sector specific
remedies. The competition rules are thus only enforced as an "ignition"
device. This approach has already been followed in the telecommunications
sector with regards to the pricing of leased lines inquiry and the mobile
termination charges inquiry.54 In the latter case, the Commission launched a
sector inquiry on the pricing of interconnection charges but subsequently
decided to stay proceedings and shift the investigation to the relevant NRAs
because the sector s~ecific framework provided a remedy for tackling the
identified problem.5
In sum, it seems that a bold transposition of Trinko could lead the EC
authorities to deprive themselves ofa useful "ignition" device. However, the
lack of clarity in the Commission's approach to these issues is not
satisfactory. In addition, the costs of the cumulative application of sector
specific regulation and competition rules cannot be ignored. This is why, the
Commission could fruitfully draw some lessons from Trinko by holding that
it will only engage into cumulative intervention under exceptional circum-
stances.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The US and EC approaches diverge substantially. The question whether the
EC shall promote a TrinJw.based approach is to be answered in a
differentiated manner. First, as far as the essential facilities doctrine is
concerned, the short overview above shows that the EC Commission would
probably gain by bringing its decision making practice closer to Trinko.56
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the Commission in recent times are contradictory.57 Given the potential
jurisdictional and substantive drawbacks of the cumulative approach, it is
suggested that the Commission should promptly clarify its position. It could
be recommended, forinstance, that the Commission adopt "best practices"
standards whereby it would eX~lain when competition rules shall be
enforced in regulated industries.
Second, as far as the interface between sector specific legislation and
competition law is concerned, the benefits from a bold transposition of
Trinko in the EC are not obvious. This is, however, not to say that no
improvements can be made in the EC. On the contrary, the signals given by
..
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See Commission Press Release lP/02/1852 of 11 december 2002, "Prices decrease of up to
40% lead Commission to close telecom leased lines inquiry".
See Commission Press Release lP/98/707 of 27july 1998, "Commission concentrates on nine
cases of mobile telephony prices". The inquiry led to the finding that several PSTN operators
charged mobile operators more than fixed operators for call termination.
The recent Eq ruling in lMS Health reiterates the Bronner conditions and thus seems to
imply that the concept ofexceptional circumstances shall not be pushed too far. See ECl,lMS
Health supra note 16, especially at §§ 48-49.
57
58
The GVG decision raises doubt as to whether the existence of access under sector specific
legislation is seriously taken into account by the Commission. Indeed, the Commission took
the view that Article 10(1) of Directive 91/440 could have been used for granting access to a
number of necessary technical and commercial information but nonetheless held that the
refusal to provide information amounted to a breach ofArticle 82 EC. See § 126. See Council
Directive 91/440 of 29 july 1991 on the development of the Community's railways, OJ L 237
of 24 August 1991, pp. 2!>-28.
This has been done in the telecommunications sector with the "Access Notice". See
Commission Notice on the Application of Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the
Telecommunications Sector OJ C 265 of 22 August 1998. A prompt clarification is required,
given that the enforcement of EC competition rules will increasingly be carried out at the
national level.
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